INTRODUCTION
Group decision making and negotiation are multi-person processes which are complex and ill-structured. They are dynamic in nature due to changing information, aspiration levels of the participants, preferences and tactics.
Moreover, decision-makers rarely conform to classical models of rational behavior (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; MacLean, 1985) . They do not want to unveil their real interests (Fisher and Ury, 1983) and may change their strategies as the process evolves over time (Lockhart, 1979; Schaffers, 1985) .
The importance of group decision making and negotiation has stimulated a large volume of research. At one end of the spectrum, behavioral scientists (e.g., Druckman, 1977; Gouran, 1979; Lewicki and Litterer, 1985a and 1985b) have examined special cases or aspects of individual behaviors in prescribed settings in an attempt to discover the importance of specific factors on the overall process. At the other end, formal attempts to understand group decision making and negotiation have utilized various forms of mathematical or logic-based representation. However, these efforts have often been at such a level of abstraction that they are rarely applied to specific real-world instances. While the behavioral approach has attempted to discover a particular rationality which may be generalized, the formal approach has assumed a general rationality which could be applied to specific problems. This paper provides an overview of formal models for group decision making and negotiation with a special focus on those that can be used in developing computer-based support systems. Section 2 discusses the main features of group decision making and negotiation and introduces four classes of multi-person decision situations. Section 3 briefly describes some formal models suggested in economics and game theory. Section 4 presents the relationships, similarities and differences between multiplecriteria decision making and negotiation. Computer support for multi-person decision situations and bargaining is introduced in Section 5. Then conceptual frameworks and actual implementations of group decision and negotiation support systems are discussed. A summary of the paper and some concluding remarks are provided in Section 6.
GROUP DECISION MAKING AND NEGOTIATION

Classes of Multi-Person Decisions
Multi-person decision-making covers a wide range of processes. In an attempt to model such processes, ole should take into account their basic features. In this section we discuss the main differences between group decision making and negotiation. We see these two types of processes as different and as members of a more general class.
We distinguish four types of multi-person decision-making situations:
Individual decision-making in a group setting. The decision maker utilizes knowledge of experts, advisers or stakeholders during the process. All group members participate in the process, but only one person is responsible for the decision made. An example of such a case is that of two regional authorities, one dealing with the ecological situation and the other responsible for the industrial development (Goncalves, 1985) .
(ii) Hierarchical or bureaucratic decision-making. There are two cases to consider here: In the cenclilized one, it is assumed that there is one set of objectives representing the top-level decision maker, and also that he has full control over the lower-levels group members. The formal model that corresponds to this situation is Dantzig and Wolfe's (1960) decomposition model. In the decentralized case, each participant independently controls subsets of the decision variables and objectives and is responsible for his decision which serves as input to the higher-level one. There is a coordination procedure assuring the optimality of the overall decision.
(iii) Group decision-making or one-party decision-making. Each group member participates in the process and is partly responsible for the final decision. There usually is an overall goal which is accepted by all the members, but they differ in the ways of how this goal should be achieved.
The decision problem can be solved by an individual but a group possesses more resources than each of it-members and the potential for making effective decision-making is greater 'Gouran, 1979; Steiner, 1972) .
(iv) Multi-party decision-making or negotiation. One decision maker represents one party and is responsible for the decision before this party and not before the other one(s). There is a conflict of interests because parties have separate and conflicting objectives (Lewicki and Litterer, 1985a ) and they have different needs which they want to satisfy (Nierenberg, 1973) . Negotiation is the chosen way to resolve a conflict out of necessity and not out of effectiveness or efficiency.
The Group Decision Problem
People make a group decision wuen they face a common problem and they all are interested in its solution. This problem may be the choice of a vacation site, the purchase of a car, or the acquisition of a house by a family; it may also be the design of a new product or a production plan for a company. An important characteristic of this situation is that all involved individuals belong to one organization (family, firm, or government). They may differ in their perception of the problem, and have different interests, but they are all responsible for the organization's well-being and share responsibility for the implemented decision.
Although the features mentioned above characterize group decision making, they do not apply to negotiation settings. Organizations may have a different representation of the decision problem and their representatives need to negotiate in order to find a settlement. For example, a buyer's problem is different from, though con • lementary to, a seller's problem; the same applies to a company manage.ient and a trade union, or to a police department and a hostage-taker. The varying perceptions may be less relevant than the different interests and goals of the involved parties.
The responsibility of a negotiator, who may be from outside the organization he represents, is solely to this organization and not to other negotiators.
Negotiation takes place when one organization cannot make a decision without the consent of another. Because negotiation involves organizations, one can expect group decision making within the process of negotiation (e.g. when a negotiator asks for new directives).
Alternative Decisions and Compromise Solutions
In group decision making, there is one set of alternative solutions.
During the decision process, this set may be expanded or contracted when, respectively, new options are added or non-efficient alternatives are dropped. Moreover, the considered and communicated alternatives are feasible, or at least subjectively feasible, i.e. perceived as such by the decision maker.
In negotiation, there may exist as many sets of alternatives as there are negotiating parties and alternatives may belong to different decision spaces. For example, in the free trade negotiations, alternatives considered by the Canadian government are different from those considered by the U.S. government. However, these different alternatives are interdependent: there is a transformation which converts an alternative from one set to an alternative in another one. Usually this transformation is a homomorphism or a quasi-morphism (Holland et al., 1987) , i.e. an alternative corresponds to a subset of alternatives. (It seems that this is one of the reasons why negotiators try to neg'tiate in their opponents' decision spaces).
Negotiating parties often choose alternatives from different spaces.
Then, each party presents its compromise proposal. The preparation of this proposal is a decision process in itself; on the basis of one alternative several proposals may be prepared differing in the consideration of the opponent's interests. In a single-issue negotiation, an alternative may be the first aspiration level (Tietz and Bartos, 1983 ) and the negotiator presents his first proposal higher than this level. This proposal may be unfeasible but the very nature of negotiation requires making concessions.
In fact, presenting initial proposals which are feasible and close to the expected consensus is called negotiating in "bad faith" (Lewicki and Litterer, 1985a, page 13) . Hence, in negotiations the initial proposals may be unfeasible because all parties exa=ct concessions.
In group decision making, concessions are required because of hard constraints which determine the feasible alternatives (Kersten, 1988) and, if possible, they are avoided. For example. a marketing department expects an increase in the quality of a product but the finance department argues that funds should be channeled to paying off debts, and there is only a given amount of funds available. Hence, in group decision making, concessions are made to improve the overall quality of a decision, while in negotiation they are part of the procedure. Moreover, in the former case, concessions change the group decision while in the latter, they affect the communicated proposal and not necessarily the settlement itself. Moreover, in group decision making, hard constraints are known, or become known during the process, to all the participants. In negotiation, each decision maker tries to hide his constraints because revealing them would weaken his bargaining position.
FORMAL MODELS FOR GROUP DECISION MAKING AND NEGOTIATION
There are numerous attempts to solve conflicts using theoretical frameworks. The two classical ones are economic models of bargaining and game-theoretic models and both utilize the utility concept.
Economic Models of Bargaining
Economic models are associated with Zeuthen's (1930) pioneering work and they treat bargaining as a process of convergence over time involving a sequence of offers and counter-offers. These models assume that the utility functions of the participants are fixed and known from the outset, and that a compromise zone exists, can be identified, and remains stable over time (Young, 1975) . Moreover, the economic models deal with negotiations involving a single issue that is homogeneous and continuously divisible, such as money (Pen, 1952 ).
An important group of economic models emphasize the role of time as a bargaining factor (Cross, 1969) . In the Cross model, bargaining is a routinized discovery process. The participant starts out with a set of expectations which he/she learns to correct on the basis of experience. The process produces determinate solutions given proper values governing the participants' behavior. If the participants are identical, the model yields the same result as the Nash solution (Cross, 1969 . page 59). The Cross model and the one proposed by Rao and Shakun (1974) aim at providing normative recommendations for concession making. Though we are concerned here with both prescriptive and descriptive aspects of the process, with situations involving multiple criteria and "non-rational" aspects of the participants' behavior, the presented approach is partly based on the Cross model.
Game-Theoretical Models
The second type of approach is based on game theory (von Neumann and Morgerstern, 1947) and its extensions (see for example, Axelrod, 1984; Fraser and Hipel, 1984) . The game models assume that the number and identity of players as well as the alternatives and utility functions are fixed and known, that players are fully rational, and that the communication takes place only within the model and it cannot affect either the form or the content of a game's payoff matrix (Luce and Raiffa, 1957) .
While research built on game theory has generated important insights into the processes and outcomes of negotiation and bargaining strategies, the restrictive assumptions underlying this framework along with the computational difficulties that arise in all but the simplest cases, have meant that appropriate mathematical constructs are difficult to develop and apply. The limitations of this approach are inherent in the basic method "... the answers provided by the theory of games are sometimes very puzzling and ambiguous" (Simon et al., 1987, page 17) .
Aggregation Models
Another often used type of approach recognizes the multiplicity of criteria underlying participants' behavior and aims at developing a decision rule(s). One assumes that the utility functions of each participant are stationary and may be first assessed separately, then aggregated by invoking the utility independence assumption. Under this assumption the bargaining process is reduced to specifying preferences and then combining them for each participant and for the whole group. The obtained group utility function (additive or multiplicative) is used to generate compromises.
The utility aggregation approach may be used in specific group decision making processes (e.g., project or scenario evaluation, joint model building) but not in typical bargaining situations where participants have conflicting objectives, display strategic behavior and withhold preferences and other information. The assumption of independent utility functions has been criticized, and an aggregate group consensus function which does not assume the existence of a von Neumann-Morgerstern utility function for each participant was proposed in the literature.
Other approaches do not require definition of a group utility or consensus function, but use decision rules defined on the alternatives
themselves. An example here is ranking of alternatives by each participant and then determining compromise alternatives through expanding-contracting operations on the set of alternatives (Bui, 1985) . Jarke et al. (1987) and Shakun (1988) propose another expanding-contracting procedure based on a goal/values referral process. Isermann (1985) assumes that the participants start from inferior alternatives and the negotiation process is a contracting procedure with participants determining the direction of changes. The Isermann model gives every participant the possibility to move from a worse to a better alternative so concessions are unnecessary.
Another example of ranking is th:, ..se of Saaty's method in group decision making (Lockett et al., 1981) .
Tactics Models
Out of analysis of labor and international negotiations, models that focus upon the tactics of bargaining have been developed (Schelling, 1966; Ikle, 1964) . Tactics models lack the restrictive assumptions of the utility-based models. They do not assume that information is complete, nor that utility functions and alternatives are given from the outset and fixed.
Manipulating these features of the bargaining situation is considered as one of the most important characteristics of the process.
The level of formalization in manipulative models is low. They cannot specify with determination bargaining outcomes, or attempt to represent negotiations as game-theoretic widels. They also cannot provide a consistent account of concession making as in the economic models or most multiple criteria decision models. Heckarton (1980) compromises may depend on the startiii, point rather than any underlying set of values (Raiffa, 1982, page 215) . It further implies that players, while regarding their own behavior as rational, are not immune to strategies of other players (Satterthwaite, 1975) . Another outcome of the importance of communication in these processes is that concessions of one player depend on concessions made by others (Komorita, 1973) . There are other behaviors which may also not be seen as rational in the traditional sense because an essential part of negotiation and bargaining as a method of making decisions is the communication between players. Since players believe that such communications may be incomplete or inaccurate (at the minimum), their own behavior in response is unlikely to be rational in the traditional sense.
Tactics models assume that decisions, and thus compromises, are time,
context, and strategy dependent in Negotiation and bargaining settings.
Even if the players' explicit utilit:2 functions are known, we may determine a compromise decision which they woul not accept. This possibility arises because the decision was determined without taking into account the art of negotiation: skills of persuasion am.: argumentation, the ability to employ bargaining ploys, and the knowledge of how and when to use them. We have also overlooked learning effects; i.e., changes in the knowledge of the problem and of the players.
Kersten and Szapiro (1986, 1988 ) presented a tactics model of the negotiation process based on the information available to both players and mediators. This model assumes the dynamic nature of negotiation, varying strategies of players and the existence of secret and unveiled goals and interests. This paper is somewhat an extension of this approach and focuses on problems of supporting negotiators in their effort to determine compromise proposals.
MCDM AND NEGOTIATION SUPPORT
The Spaces Where Decisions Can Be Made
The models outlined in section 3 are aimed at describing and analyzing group decision and negotiation processes. Although some of them were computerized, their use was either incidental or limited to a very specific situation. There is an ongoing discussion about the usefulness and scope of use of group decision support systems (GDSS) and negotiation support systems Raiffa (1976) and Kersten et al. (1988) .
The Decision Variable Space
The decision variables are the detailed actions that are taken, communicated, and when a compromise is reached, agreed upon. The level of decision variable may be coarse or fine, depending on the situation. For example, it may be the total number of sprockets produced in a month, or a total production time devoted to a class of products. The decision variable is a familiar concept in mathematical programming, where the x vector is the vector of decision variables. The decision variables together with their values which are considered at any point of time constitute a decision or a compromise proposal. Thus, group decision making may be reduced to an exchange of decisions between the group members, and negotiation -a similar exchange of compromise proposals.
The space of decision variables consists of feasible and unfeasible decisions. In the continuous case, there is a set of constraints which allow determination of the feasibility of a decision, and in the discrete case the feasible decisions can be -numerated. If all the participants in the decision process agree upon these constraints, then they are called hard constraints, in the sense that the7 are binding for each participant. In negotiations, often the hard constraints are discussed during the pre-negotiation phase when the parties determine the definitions of a particular decision variable, or its possible values.
An important feature of the decision variable space is its objectivity. The participants of the process are linked together only through a decision; the decision space provides the platform on which other spaces can be built. The participants differ in the evaluation of a decision but the requirement for the effective negotiation or group decision is the objectivity in understanding a decision.
For some problems, it may be difficult to determine decision variables or it may be convenient not to distinguish between them. A decision about the management strategy for a large corporation often involves too many decision variables to make effective choices. Even in simpler problems, it may be difficult to distinguish between a decision and an objective, as in the case of union/management salary negotiations.
The Objective Function and Weight Spaces
A second space to consider is the objective function space. The There is an analogy between the objective function space and the party space. Therefore one can introduce a concept similar to the non-dominated (efficient) solution. It is the Pareto optimality solutions in the party space. We say that a solution is Pareto optimal if and only if there does not exist another solution for which every party is at least as well off and at least one party is strictly better off. Pareto optimal solutions are considered to be desirable in negotiations. If a solution is not Pareto optimal, that means that one or more parties can negotiate gains at no cost to the other parties. This is possible if the utility functions are mutually independent and this assumption reflects rational behavior of the parties, i.e. one party's increase in its utility does not imply another party's decrease.
Continuing the analogy between the multiple objectives of an individual and multiple individuals, we may define the party weight space.
Remarks given with respect to the (individual) weight space do hold here.
The party weight space could be introduced, if we were to assume a societal utility function (social welfare function) or a "supra decision maker"
(Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) .
The party weight space may be used in the mixed "MCDM/voting" support systems. The party utility space is used in, for example MEDIATOR (Jarke et al., 1987) and it is also further discussed in Raiffa (1985) . Note that instead of using the party utility space explicitly, one can also use the Cartesian product of the objective function spaces (it is called the Cartesian product). Here the difference between group decision and negotiation is that in the former case, all the dimensions are known to all the individuals, while in the latter one, a negotiating party would know only its own subspace. It would be only the computer (acting as a facilitator or mediator) which would have access to all the information. An extension of VIG from individual to group decision or negotiation would be an example of a support system in the objective function spaces. Another example is NEGO (Kersten, 1985) .
The above considerations and the sequence of the geometrical spaces leading from the neutral decision space, possibly with many dimensions to one dimensional supra utility or welfare function, are general in that they do not restrict the possible approaches to NSS and GDSS design. Only one assumption should hold, which is the economic rationality of the involved individuals or parties. Hence, one c=in incorporate the aspirations which may cause the objective functions ,he utility functions to be defined for the aspiration levels intervals. The reservation prices (the lowest/highest acceptable values), shifts in negotiation tactics, and context dependent concessions can also be introduced. the paradigm is, however, that a Pareto optimal solution is desirable, and that the decision problem can be expressed as a problem of identifying acceptable Pareto optimal solutions.
COMPUTER SUPPORT FOR GROUP DECISION MAKING AND NEGOTIATION
One of the issues this paper tries to address is defining the type of computer-based information systems that has the potential to support group decision making and facilitate negotiation processes. The first part of this section describes some conceptual frameworks for GDSS and NSS that were proposed in the literature and summarizes their key features. The second part presents illustrative examples o f system implementations in the area of group decision and negotiation support. consensus, and problems of coordination. These issues should be taken into account when designing GDSS "shells". The intervention of such systems aims at reducing the negative impact of these behavioral issues.
Conceptual Frameworks for GDSS and NSS
Based on the experiments conducted at the University of Arizona, and implications for future work were discussed.
In the NSS Area, a number of conceptual frameworks have been suggested in the literature. The one proposed by Jarke et al. (1987) build computer-based support systems using these frameworks and to empirically test their effectiveness.
Examples of GDSS and NSS Implementations
An increasing number of researchers are investing considerable time and effort in designing and implementing computer-based information systems for group decision and negotiatioi support. Anson and Jelassi (1990) , Jelassi and Foroughi (1989) , Jelassi and Jones (1988) , DeSanctis and Gallupe (1987) , Kersten (1987) , Nyhart and Goeltner (1987) and Kraemer and King (1986) have identified some sixty GDSS and NSS. In the GDSS area, significant experiments took place in North American university laboratories, in particular at the University of Arizona where the PLEXSYS system was developed and at the University of Minnesota, home of the SAMM system.
The University of Arizona has two GDSS rooms in operation. The smaller system (Nunamaker et al., 1987) provides 16 personal computers whose screens are imbedded in a U-shaped table (see Figure 1) . A public screen can be used to show what is on the facilitator's screen. The system's program and data reside on a data server that is also used as the facilitator's workstation. The second, larger system provides 24 workstations and two projection screens arranged in amphitheatre style (see ranking, and voting. Any participant can ask to view the current state of the decision on the screen, without having to go through the facilitator.
Notice that the personal screens face toward the public screen rather than being built into the table (see Figure 3) . [For more details on these and other GDSS implementations, the reader is referred to (Gray and Olfman, 1989) ].
--Insert Figure 3 here --
In the NSS area, existing implementations differ widely in the type and amount of support they can provide. At one end of the spectrum, NSS
consist of a computerized model that performs computations or quantitative analysis used during the negotiation process. Such systems serve as "backroom processors" and thus play a rather passive role. Examples of these NSS include DECISION TREE (Winter, 1985) and DECISION MAKER (Fraser and Hipel, 1984) . [For a detailed discussion of these systems, see Jelassi.
and Foroughi, 1989] . and objective (quantitative) data and analyzes decision-maker preferences for possible solutions (agreements). Each negotiating party uses PREFCALC (Euro-Decision, 1986; Lauer and Jelassi, 1987) , a single-user multicriteria DSS, to establish their individual preferences and problem representation, which are transferred then to the common (mainframe) database. The human mediator integrates these individual problem representations using relational query language capabi l ilies to form an initial group joint problem representation (Jarke and Jelassi, 1986) . Negotiations are undergone by consensus seeking through exchange of information and compromise. MEDIATOR is useful for multi-player, multi-criteria, illstructured, dynamic problems.
Proceeding along the spectrum, we find two recently proposed systems:
the KAJ NSS (Anson and Jelassi, 1990) and MEDIANSS (Carmel and Herniter, 1989) . These NSS provide interactive support for the entire negotiation process through the use of GDSS features such as electronic communication and group process structuring techniques, in addition to the employment of quantitative analysis methods and game-theoretical models for conflict resolution. MEDIANSS was strongly influenced by the KAJ model. Negotiating teams are guided by the mediator through a structured set of computerized steps. These consist of the followihc: rule setting, role reversal, issues and reason identification, issue consolidation, ranking, package creation, proposal presentation, linking, house trading, and agreement wording.
At the extreme end of the spectrum are rule-based NSS which use expert systems techniques to play an active role in the negotiation process (Sycara, 1987 ). An example of such NSS is RUNE (Kersten et al., 1988) Recent research in applying artificial intelligence to decision making and negotiation (Kersten et al.. 1988; Kersten and Szpakowicz, 1990; Sycara, 1987) opens up new possibilities for providing effective support to decision makers as well as bargaining parties.
Negotiators' knowledge is one of the forces shaping the process and influencing its outcome. This knowledge increases and dynamically evolves over time and therefore artificial intelligence may well provide the appropriate techniques and tools for its representation and manipulation.
The ultimate objective here is to offer negotiating parties a means by which they can directly define and evaluate possible settlements. Hence the support system will allow negotiators to act as their own mediator, rather than having to go through a third party, human or machine-based, which is quite often imposed on them. Achieving this objective would be a significant step toward improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the negotiation process.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aim of this paper was to introduce some formal models of group decision making and negotiation and discuss ways in which recent advances in information technology can be applied to these managerial activities. A special focus was on the concept of computer support for such multi-person, complex, dynamic, and ill-structured processes.
As can be noticed from the sections on conceptual frameworks and actual implementations of group decision and negotiation support systems, NSS, see respectively and (Jones and ].
There is a need for more rigorous research on the role computers can play in group decisions and conflicts and their impact on the process outcomes as well as on the participants' attitudes. Further conceptual studies are needed in the field, in conjunction with the development of more effective NSS and GDSS technologies. A necessary subsequent step in such a research agenda should be the real-world, "live" testing of these computerbased systems in order to evaluate their actual benefits as well as their shortcomings.
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